Every process of mass migration is stimulated by a series of structural shifts -negatives in the country of origin and promotional in the place of destination -which trigger the movement of whole sectores of the population and which confer to each of these migrations its characteristics. The Spanish immigration to Argentina, between 1870 and 1930, can be considered as a case of the development and interaction of pushing and pulling migration factors in Spain and the recipient country, respectively. The above mentioned dates have been chosen because they enclose half a century which represent the period of mass immigration into Argentina 1 . To analyze causes and effects in Spain and Argentina, Spanish immigration's main characteristics, its fluctuating rates and its growing urbanization is the purpose of this study. It also discusses the impact of Spanish migration on Argentina's development and the diplomatic tension between both countries in the last years of the monarchy of Alfonso XIII.
Europe and Spain in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century
Demographic studies indicate that each cycle of economic crisis is accompanied by a corresponding cycle of population crisis. The increase of the cost of essential commodities such as food products (bread in particular in Western Europe) alters the social circumstances and the living standards of the working population. The worker is faced with an unbalance in his cost of living; consequently, he reduces his demands for non-essential products.
Indireclty, the situation creates a chain reaction which affects the security of his own wages (wage reductions and unemployment). As a consequence, depression, growing inflation and financial difficulties force him to search for a more lucrative and secure source of work, moving first from the country or small town to the urban, industrial centers. If these also have been affected by the crises, his only way is to emigrate to areas which can offer better labor conditions and living standards 2 .
All Europe underwent three strong depressions during the second half of the nineteenth century, those marked by the years 1857, 1866 and, above all, 1873-1875. Although these crises had a financial origin, which created a strong monetary devaluation on the continental markets, they also lowered the demand for manufactured products in foreign and local trade and were each accompanied by a significant agrarian crisis. In the case of Spain, the extended and severe bread crisis during the Restoration (1868-74) brought famine and unemployment. It also fostered a state of mind for cutting ties with the homeland among large masses who sought better chances and higher standards of living abroad.
The 1860's and 1870's imposed significant modifications in the political structure of Europe: the Crimean, Danish-Prussian, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian Wars resulted in the consolidation of the Central European powers and engendered the large-scale migration of pacifists, ethnic minorities and political dissidents. Perhaps, the most noticiable example of these politically-triggered population movements are the waves of French emigration between 1.870 and 1890, which followed the fall of the monarchy (first wave) and the subsequent failure of the Commune (second wave). It is, thus, possible to observe the coordinated action of political and economic causes working together to produce mass migrations.
Men from all walks of life, languages and cultures believed that the New World was the panacea for all their problems, or at least they thought that those vast virgin lands and untamed frontiers could offer them a better life, a new start, and perhaps even a fortune. The United States, Argentina, Canada, and Brazil were the American countries which attracted and received most of that population displaced from Europe by unemployment, ideological dissent or simply because of fear of continuing inflation.
In the case of Spain, the migratory movement did not acquire real importance until close to the end of the century. This puzzling delay has a logical explanation. Following the Revolution of September of 1868 which produced the dethronement and exile of Isabel II, there was a lengthy period of political instability. A number of weak governments followed each other within a matter of months without finding a solution to the problems of the country. Soon the Third Carlist War began (1872) and the central government could only be reorganized after the military coup of 1874 which restored the monarchy and placed Alfonso XII on the throne. The perplexing thing is that civil war, the consequent military recruitments and political turmoil did not motivate the masses, extremely passive and far from the interests of the political circles. This fact can be explained by analyzing the economic situation. After an era of stagnation, defined by Vicens Vives as one of "irresolute economic prospectives" -which lasted from 1843 to 1854 -Spain had entered a period of remarkable expansion 3 . Railways crisscrossed and connected the whole Peninsula, foreign investment poured into industrial development projects and Spain became known as one of the most stable areas in Europe. This era of economic expansion lasted until 1882. The prosperity of the Isabelline period continued during the Restoration, creating a new liberal capitalist group which emerged from the middle classes. This process of recovery broke away from the traditional molds of Spanish society, economy and power structure but it had a very restrictive nature, as it was controlled by and only served the purposes of the urban upper middle class. On the other hand, most of the people of Spain remained excluded from the boom or received only marginal benefits from the prosperity.
It should be noted that during half a century the Spanish lower classes had experienced no social change, except for a small urban proletariat which started showing up in areas like Catalonia, Valencia and some of the Northeastern provinces. Most of the rural workers of the Peninsula were still involved in a primitive pastoral or small agricultural economy, which they could not develop above subsistence level, and many of them had to take temporary jobs elsewhere in order to survive. The main reason for all this poverty was the very peculiar land distribution system of Spain. In Galicia, where the port of Vigo soon became the principal exporter of emigrants to America, there prevailed a system of mini-cultivation on "handkerchief-soze plots", characterized by below subsistence level production. This, besides an extremely high fertility rate, created a permanent overpopulation which could not be absorbed by the subsidiary fishing industry 4 .
The opposite happened in areas like Andalusia and Extremadura, where great expectations had been raised by the laws of 1833 and 1855 which succeeded in breaking the entail on real property, the intention being to expropíate the properties of the Church and create a greater number of small landowners. However, all these hopes were completely wiped out in the following decades by the ruling political circles, as most of the land was turned over the rich bourgeoisie to become extensive latifundia. As a consequence, in Andalusia and other areas there was a surplus of working hands and available land was practically nonexistent. "Displaced farmers, under the pressure of debts, famine, expoliating taxes, began leaving their land. Severe droughts, the agrarian crisis of 1873-1875, two disastrous harvests, the soaring price of bread, the following stagnation of the internal market and a wave of unemployment pushed them from the peripheral overpopulated areas to the large cities, where some work was still available in the industrial plants. Madrid, Barcelona and some other similarly large cities became the main centers of attraction. Then the crises moved into them too ; new waves of unemployed peasants and workers forced the level of industrial wages down.
Demographic growth added another important factor to the political and economic causes of emigration. Until the 1860's the size of Spain's population remained relatively stable but since then it has experienced constantly increasing growth. Infant and adult mortality rates dropped drastically as medical science improved. Epidemics like cholera and typhus were controlled as sewers and other sanitary measures turned ports and cities into healthier places. This happened throughout Europe, and Spain was no exception. Taking into account the increase in fertility, the fact that emigration to America was temporarily halted in the 1860's by wars (the American Civil War, the War of the Triple Alliance, the Cuban revolution of 1868, the French occupation of Mexico, being among the most important), and the suspension of normal relations between Spain and the countries of the South Pacific, the Peninsula experienced an invigorating increase of some one hundred thousand new inhabitants per annum. This further accentuated the pressure of overpopulation so that, as soon as peace returned to America, the Spaniards began leaving again in even larger numbers for the New World 5 .
Conditions offered by Argentina to Spanish Immigration
As mentioned above, massive European emigration really started in the second half of the nineteenth century. Irishmen, the British and most Northwestern Europeans preferred the United States. After the conclusion of the Civil War (1865) it became their primary destination. But by the end of the century North America was also turned into a haven for a large share of Southern European emigrants, above all for the Italians. The population flow was less intense towards South America. The ups and downs of the migration trends reflect the recurring turbulence during the period of national organization in those young countries. Argentina and Brazil received the largest quota of immigrants and in both cases it was Southern Europeans, mostly Italians, who made up the most important contingent 6 .
5) Raymond C a r r, Spain 1808 -1939 , Oxford 1966 ; Antoni J u tglar, La era industrial en España. Aproximación a la historia social de la Espana Contemporánea, Barcelona 1963, 78-88 ; Jorge Nadal O 1 -1 e r, La población española (siglos XVI al XX), Barcelona 1966, 132-133 ; José María Jover Zamora, "La época de la Restauración", in: Antonio U b i e t o et al., Introducción a la Historia de España, Barcelona 1970, 697-739. On Spanish latifundia see Pascual C a r r i ó η, Los latifundios en España, Madrid 1932, passim; Edward E. M a 1 e d a k i s, Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain. Origins of the Civil War, New Haven 1970, 61-64, 133-137. 6 ) Although Brazil received less immigrants than Argentina, this country promoted immigration by offering free transportation to its ports and recruited settlers through special clandestine colonization agents (many countries prohibited emigration to Brazil as several work contracts turned out to be nothing but a replacement of slave labor on plantations). See report of Antonio Casal, La Coruna, December 31, 1875 and report of Brasilie Cittadini, Milano, January 31, 1876, in: República Argentina, Informe anual del comisario general de Immigración de la República Argentina. Año 1875, Buenos Aires 1876, 305-324, 386-388. During the 1870's the three above mentioned countries entered a period of remarkable economic growth and territorial expansion which created an even larger demand for labor which could not be supplied by the native population. Immigration was the answer to their problems and they openly encouraged it.
Argentina launched a progressive and liberal policy supported by its Constitution of 1853; it favored project of colonization and distribution of exploitable land 7 . The statement of Juan Bautista Alberdi, gobernar es poblar, exemplifies the thinking behind the opening of the land to all foreigners and represents the mentality of the Generation of the 1880 considered the cultural and biological basis of present Argentine society 8 . A pivotal presidential term, that of Nicolas Avellaneda, would give new life and intensity to this population policy. As in the United States with the expansion towards the West, the Conquest of the Desert (1879-1880) allowed the effective occupation of one third of the national territory and eliminated the Indian as a dangerous neighbor. When the city of Buenos Aires became a federal district in 1880, the lengthy conflicts between porteños (Buenos Aires) and provincianos (the men of the provinces) were ended. With, the restoration of peace and prosperity, the vast pampa was opened to railway expansion and extensive agricultural settlement. These two important steps had not yet been carried out when the government promulgated the Law of Colonization and Immigration in 1876, at a time where the nation was emerging from serious economic crisis. The law contained provisions related to transportation, reception and settlement of immigrants, the concession of public lands, and loans and guarantees. Although it was only a theoretical beginning, which demanded considerable expenditures that the government could not initially afford, it served as an effective inducement to bring displaced Europeans to Argentina. Avellaneda's presidency also witnessed an important change in the rural economic structure of the country when the traditional pastoral system was transformed into an extensive modernized agricultural economy. The native horseman knew how to handle cattle but he had to give way to the European, who was familiarized with plowing, tending a crop and harvesting it. Furthermore, Argentina, which until the 1870's had been customarily an importer of wheat and flour, started producing these commodities, to become one of the largest cereal exporters of the world 9 .
Spanish immigrants preferred Argentina to Brazil for several reasons. Language had priority. No less important was the climate factor since Brazil's coasts ravaged by cholera and the heat of the tropics were feared by potential migrants. In addition, working conditions in a labor market dominated by the slaves work exerted less appeal on the Spaniards. To sum up, these negative factors pushed them to the port of Buenos Aires where the promised immediate employment and very good seasonal wages during the harvest-time encouraged their displacement to Argentina 10 .
Characteristics and Effects of Spanish Immigration into Argentina
Immigration policy before 1876 was weak and sporadically applied. The settlement process was entrusted to private entrepreneurs. As a consequence, the first Argentine national census (1869) showed that the foreigner had still not achieved numerical 9 ) On the Generation of 1880, see Thomas F. M c G a η n, Argentina, the United States and the Inter-American System, 1880 -1914 , Cambridge, Mass., 1957 ; Oscar E. C o r η b 1 i t, Ezequiel Gallo and Alfredo O ' C ο η η « 11, "La generación del 80 y su proyecto: antecedentes y consecuencias", in: Torcuato S. d i Telia, Gino Germani, Jorge Graciar e η a et al, Argentina. Sociedad de masas, Buenos Aires 1966, 18-58. On the period 1880-1910, asa whole, see Ferrari and Gallo, comps.,La Argentina del Ochenta al Centenario, Buenos Aires 1980.
1 °) Vicente Vazquez Presedo, El caso argentino, Migración de factores, comercio exterior y desarrollo, 1875 -1914 , Buenos Aires 1971 importance among the population. Only 11.5 per cent of the 1,800,000 inhabitants claimed a foreign origin and, except for the settlers of the agricultural colonies of Santa Fe and Entre Rios, most of these aliens were living in Buenos Aires or other large urban areas.
Between 1857, the year national statistics were first compiled, and 1875, the year prior to the passage of the Colonization and Immigration Law, only 54,455 Spaniards had come to settle in Argentina. If compared with the number of Italian immigrants during the same period (208, 760) , it may be seen that Spanish immigration ranked a distant second in the immigrant total 11 . Although general immigration increases toward the end of the century, Spaniards still come to the Rio de la Plata at a slow pace. A notable increase in the Spanish immigration will appear only in the 1900's.
There is an explanation for this delay: during the 1870*5 and 1880's Cuba and Puerto Rico, then overseas possessions of Spain, were the primary destinations of Spanish emigrants. Only with the Treaty of Paris (1898), which formalized the loss of the last remnants of the Spanish empire in America and Asia, would the Spaniards turn towards the South Atlantic, particularly to Argentina. Within a few years it would become the primary receiving nation for emigrants from the Peninsula. Cuba and Brazil ranked next as receiver nations. Algeria, so close to their homeland, did not attain such emigrant preference. Neither did the prosperous United States which did attract large numbers of Italians during the last two decades of the century 12 .
In order to confer a quantitative value to the migrant flow between Spain and Argentina, it is important to remember that Spain ranked fifth among the labor-exporting European countries (preceded by Great Britain and Ireland, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany) and that from 1846 to 1932 it saw some 4,573,000 people leave its shores. During the same period, Argentina received 6,405,000 immigrants, occupying second place in the world after the United States, and preceding Canada, Brazil Since the appeareance of the first statistical records of 1857, the modest growth in Spanish immigration rates reaches various small peaks. The years 1871-1875, which correspond with the already mentioned severe agrarian crisis and the exile of republicans and Carlists from Spain, constitute the first such peak. The second (1886-1890) represents thé years of tremendous Argentine agricultural expansion, which induced an intensive upsurge in migration 15 . In the following five-years span, the figures show an appreciable loss (75 per cent) as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1890, a year when not only Spaniards, but immigrants of all other nationalities felt the impact of the stock- exchange crash, sudden unemployment and other economic blows. However, Argentina recovered rapidly and Spaniards came at an ever increasing rate. It is amazing that there was only a slight decline in the period 1911-1915, since an intensive propaganda campaign in Spain had warned people not to emigrate to Argentina where since 1913 work was scarce, unemployment in the cities was high and proscpects were bleak.
World War I increased these difficulties as limitations were put on Atlantic shipping but when postwar traffic resumed, immigrants again flowed into Buenos Aires. In the first half of 1920 the Spaniards would constitute the largest quota of immigrants into Argentina. Their number would grow until 1923 when Miguel Primo de Rivera established his dictatorship in Spain. Then the figures drop: 53,930 in 1920, 51,899 in 1921, 60,190 in 1922, 13,544 in 1923, and 12,752 in 1924 . By 1922 the Italians had regained the lead which they had first yielded to the Spaniards in 1915, as a consequence of Italy's involvement in the war 16 . In the last years of the period under consideration, until 1930, Spanish emigration would continue to decline. Increasingly larger groups of Germans, Poles, Czechoslovaks and Yugoeslavs would compensate for the decline in Spanish immigration to Argentina. The government of Primo de Rivera and Argentina imposed restrictions on anarchists and leftists in general in coincidence with the economic crisis of 1929. Spanish immigration to Argentina would recover some strengh only after World War II 17 .
Statistical data on net migratory balance (viz. the difference between immigrants and emigrants) are quite contradictory. Data from Spain and Argentina are conflicting and the situation is further complicated by the large number of seasonal workers, called golondrinas or swallows, which crossed the Atlantic every year during the harvest season, then returned home three or four months later with a substancial amount of wages in their pocket which allowed them to subsist in Spain during the rest of the year. The following spring they would embark for Buenos Aires to start the whole cycle over again. With the exception of a few known political dissidents, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between genuine emigrants and temporary motivated emigrants, so as to establish a ratio of residence and settlement 18 . Many of them, perhaps, only thought of hacer la América, that is, strike it rich, return to the homeland and live from the benefits made abroad 19 .
A purpose of this study is to point out the difficulty involved in searching statistical abstracts for figures on migrants returning to Spain. Such figures would help in determining the number of Spaniards who acquired permanent residence in Argentina. An alternate approach to gaining a better understanding of the importance of the Spanish contribution to Argentina's population is to sample global data derived from the Third and Fourth National Censuses as indicated below: The reduced percentage of both nationalities may be traced to a virtual stemming of immigrant flow by 1930, to the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent submarine warfare in the Atlantic 80 per cent of the adults were single while only 49 per cent of the adult females were unmarried. Thus, these ratios do not break up European migration patterns. The approximately 11,000 Spanish family units admitted were very small in size with a ratio of only 1.3 children per family 22 . Twelve years later, in 1921, the percentages had changed lightly in favour of the adult males (61.44 per cent), while the number of adult females remained practically unaltered (26.67 per cent). Figures for infants, however, showed a 1 to 2 per cent reduction (7.21 males and 6.65 females). Fifty per cent of all immigrants were from 21 to 40 years old, and more than 30 per cent in the 41 to 59 year span. The remarkable high number (50 per cent of all Spanish immigrants) of single adult males clearly indicated the intended temporary nature of their residence. The entry of unmarried women (12 per cent of the total Spanish quota) was perhaps motivated by plans to marry resident countrymen or by promises of work as house-servants, since they could get better pay and treatment than in Spain 23 .
Although many Spaniards became disappointed with working conditions and non-existing housing facilities which forced them to return home or travel to another country, it can be stated that a large majority remained in Argentina·, began families, and built themselves a good future. It is a fact that Spaniards had the 22 ) Al sina, La inmigración, 42-43, 61-62 ( The Defeat of a Purpose: Spanish Immigrants Urbanization Strong competition among international shippers made massive transportation across the Atlantic very inexpensive 26 . As mentioned before, the port of Vigo was the main embarkation point, and together with La Coruña and Villagarcia de Arosa it handled the largest contingent of Spanish migrants, the Galicians 27 . The Catalans, who sailed from the important port of Barcelona, comprised the second largest group. Málaga, Cádiz, and Almería handled the shipping needs of Andalusia, while Santander and Bilbao saw the departure of the Asturians and Basques. Beyond the mainland, large groups from the Balearic and 24 ) Germani, Politica y sociedad, 246, 276. The second highest rate was that of the Germans (58.7 per cent) followed by the Italians (55.5 per cent).
) G e r m a η i, Política y sociedad, 287. Consideration should be paid to the fact that mass immigration had been suspended since 1930, and that many Argentines were excluded from this survey because their grandparents, not their parents, had come from Spain. the Canary Islands joined the migrant flow. All of these peri· pheral areas suffered from the same negative factors: lack of land and of economic opportunity, a high fertility rate and consequently, demographic pressure. In the case of Galicia, according to Ν a d a 1, the working class was forced to leave the country by "bossism, usury and exploitive landleases" 28 . Spanish America, and particularly Argentina, became an escape valve for the excess population of the Peninsula. Spain could have offset the migratory process by extensive internal colonization, a better land distribution system and important industrial projects to provide work and a better life for those who emigrated. The high mortality rate in Spain -29 per thousand compared to 18 per thousand for the rest of Europe -curtailed normal demographic expansion and kept population growth practically stagnant until the Civil War (1936) 29 .
Although the outflow of emigrants was partially responsible for demographic stagnation in Spain, it also temporarily defused a potential population explosion. Those emigrants became an economic asset to their homeland. Spurred by the demands of Spanish settlers in Argentina, trade between Argentina and Spain grew steadily over the years. Argentina was second only to Cuba in Latin American purchases from Spain. Although this bilateral trade was relatively unimportant when compared with the general foreign trade of Spain and Argentina with other countries in Europe and America, it had multiplied at least eightfold by World War I. Spanish-Argentine trade was estimated at a value of 39,500,000 pesetas in 1903, 144,900,000 pesetas in 1916, 230,500,000 in 1920 and 287,200,000 pesetas in 1929 30 . A con- siderable export surplus turned each year into a large trade deficit due to a gradually increasing flow of money-remittances from emigrants to their families in Spain. Consequently, one can agree with Pike's statement that this capital flow from Latin America had its importance in "enabling Spain to avoid serious balance of payment deficits" 31 , adding that Argentina played the most important role among the Spanish-American countries.
The professed intention of the Generation of 1880 was to bring the immigrants to settle the vast uninhabited prairies of the pampas. In order to accomplish this, however, they had to fight against their own procrastination in the enforcement of the laws and against the utilitarian materialism showed by so many of them. According to their philosophy, the access to richness and power through the appropiation of more and more land did not contradict the common ideal of calling the people of the whole world "to come to inhabit the Argentine soil" (Preamble, Constitution of 1853).
Many foreigners followed the appeal but found that -except for the province of Santa Fe, where until the 1890's land was subdivided and turned into agricultural colonies 32 -most'of the best topsoil had an owner, unwilling to sell or to rent for more than two or three years. Only the strongest and most enterprising, after years of tenant-farming and moving around like gypsies, could purchase the land they had tilled with so much effort. By 1914 some 22 per cent of the foreigners owned their own farm or cattle ranch. The extensive latifundia smothered any chance of creating a large rural middle class in Argentina, such as 31) Pike, Hispanismo, 245. In the years 1924-26 some 400 million pesetas were sent to Spain from Spaniards living in Argentina and Uruguay. The total sent from Spanish America was 500 million pesetas. See Pike, Hispanismo, 441, note 84. 32) Gustavo Β e y h a u t, Roberto Cortes Conde, Haydee G or o s t e g u i and Susana Torrado, "Los inmigrantes en el sistema ocupacional argentino", in: D i Telia, Argentina, sociedad de masas, 94-99, 105-109; Cortés Conde and G a 11 o. La formación de la Argentina moderna, 69-70, 73-74. the Homestead Act of 1862 had promoted and brought to life in the United States 33 . Some of the Spanish landowners even made fortunes. Such were the cases of Manuel Menéndez, the pioneer of Patagonia, and Francisco Alcobendas, who owned vast sheep and cattle ranches 34 ; but these were exceptions to the rule. Most could only acquire small, heavily mortaged farms. They were the lucky ones as there was another 65-70 per cent of rural Spanish residents who had to earn a living as tenant-farmers (chacareros), administrators, overseers or simply day-laborers for wealthy foreigners (mostly British and French) or Argentines. Their condition was probably not worse than that they had left in Spain, but statistical data do not take into account the fact that, for every hundred Spaniards who were persistent and found a way of life in the pampas, there were another two or three hundred who failed, became discouraged and had to return to the cities where industries and commerce offered a better labor-market 35 .
The large return of the Spaniards to the urban areas contributed to their process of expansion, particularly in the Eastern seabord turning them into places where foreigners greatly outnumbered the native population. This unbalanced situation aggravated by the lack of housing facilities forced the formation of overcrowded slum-areas whithin those cities. Ultimately, the purpose of the immigration was defeated. In later years, a large portion of the immigrants would not even make the effort to try their chances inland 36 . There were 13,900 Spaniards (7.8 per cent of the total population) in the city of Buenos Aires in 1869. They increased to 80,400 (12.1 percent) in 1895 and numbered 306,900 (19.4 per cent) in 1914. One out of every fixe porteños was a Spaniard. In the province of Buenos Aires, which included the suburbs of the capital city, they increased from 70,000 (7.6 per cent) in 1895 to 273,800 (13,2 per cent) in 1914. Similarly high urban concentrations of Spaniards existed in Rosario (Santa Fe), Córdoba and Mendoza. In the last city they had increased from 2.2 per cent to 14.9 per cent of the total population. Meanwhile, the Italian population of the city of Buenos Aires had decreased from 27.3 per cent in 1895 to 19.8 per cent in 1914. These statistics, which contradict A 1 s i η a ' s statement 37 , suggest that the Spaniards were the most urban-minded among the different immigrant nationalities. More than one third (38.22 per cent) of the migrants from the Peninsula never moved from the city of Buenos Aires 38 .
During the nineteenth century Spain did not hinder the constant flow of emigration towards Argentina, as these overseas Spaniards were a valuable source of ever-increasing money remit- tances. This policy of "benign neglect" was altered only in the 1930's. Thanks to the efforts of Julio Puyol, secretary of the Institute of Social Reform, and a few other concerned men, a manual was published. It contained information on legal, economic, sanitary and other related matters. The manual was intended to reduce the abuses immigrants had frequently suffered at the hands of clandestine emigration agents. In 1909 Spain introduced the De la Cierva Law on emigration. It established the Consejo de Emigración (Council of Emigration) to protect Spanish citizens from these devious agents, who even used to "buy" children to send them to work as cheap labor overseas. In the print-shops, textile mills, food and tobacco factories of Buenos Aires, children 6 and 7 years of age working a fourteen hours day for a few pennies were not an uncommon sight 39 . False workcontracts, and agents disappearing after collecting the immigrants fare in advance, were other problems that this law was supposed to alleviate. But in fact, Spanish authorities did little to enforce this wise legislation until a Catalan journalist, Miguel Toledano Escalante, started an intensive campaign to warn Spaniards against emigrating to America. By 1918, when a new Emigration Law was passed to complement the one of 1907, the campaign against emigration to the Río de la Plata had spread to most ports of the Peninsula. But it was not until the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera that a third Emigration Law (1924) created the General Superintendence of Emigration (Dirección General de Emigración) with agencies in the main Spanish ports to protect and counsel the prospective emigrants. This final measure, however, came half a century too late. Soon the depression of 1929 and restrictive immigration policies in Argentina would virtually end the flow of Spaniards 40 .
In Argentina legislation underwent a complete cycle from prodigal liberalism to ultra-conservative restrictionism. During the presidencies of Mitre (1862-68) and Sarmiento (1868-74) large 3®) On child labor see Panettieri, Los trabajadores, 82-85. 40 ) Pike, Hispanismo, 242-248; C a r r, Spain, 414, nr. 2. On immigration agents see Panettieri, Inmigración en la Argentina, 49-59.
tracts of land in Patagonia and the Chaco frontier were set aside for colonization purposes 41 . However, it was not until the presidency of Avellaneda that the congress sanctioned the first law for the promotion of immigration (Nr. 761/1875). In the following year the liberal Colonization and Immigration Law of October 6, 1876 was passed. This law, designed to protect and regulate the immigration into the country and to financially secure and provide shelter and land for prospective residents, experienced several amendments and supplementary addenda in the following forty years. Imperfect at it was, it fulfilled its main objective because it effectively opened the flood-gates of mass migration. But it also whetted the appetite of the elite for the appropiation of land and started an era of scandalous land speculation. The resultant latifundia destroyed any possibility of creating a strong rural middle class based on the immigrant 42 . The interest in increasing immigration was so great that in 1889 the government had passed a law to provide free passage for 30,000 immigrants. The new century would see the liberal policy in decline. In 1902 (November 22), as a consequence of the subversive action of anarchists and socialists, the government promulgated the Ley de Residencia (Residence Law) which under the name "Expulsión de extranjeros" was originally prepared by Miguel Cane, celebrated writer and one of the most distinguished members of the generation of 1880. The law allowed the authorities to expelí all politically undesirable persons. Restrictions were added two years later with the Labor Code which forbade the admission of all "socially dangerous" persons linked with "illness, crime and corruption". In 1910, faced with leftist agitation and strikes, the Congress added the Law of Social Defense (June 30) which expressly prohibited the entrance of anybody indicated for a crime, anarchists "and other extremists", or anybody who advocated violence to change the institutions or the society, and readmission was denied to anybody who had previously been expelled from Argentina. More limitations would be imposed in 1923; a government decree gave the authorities the right of admission or rejection without appeal. Also in 1923 a fee of thirty gold pesos was imposed on all visa documents (a sure means of making the immigration of the destitute impossible) and, as this measure was not sufficient to prevent immigration, a 1932 decree (November 26) restricted admission only to the relatives of established residents, rural workers with a valid work-contract, or people who could prove possession of at least 1,500 pesos. Since 1938 all immigration has been under a visasystem and admission has been regulated by the authorities 43 .
Impact of Spanish Immigrants in the Development of Argentina
As farmers or urban residents, the Spaniards had a considerable influence on the general development of Argentina making a substantial contribution to the changes the country would experience in the sixty years after 1870. Mention should first be made of their role in the sevenfold expansion of the population in half a century, a feat not accomplished by any of the other receiver nations during that period 44 . With the exception of gastronomy, an area in which the Italians remained supreme masters, the Spaniards had the strongest foreign influence on Argentine customs, habits and arts. In no other receiver nation would the foreigner impose his influence so strongly on the native population as in Argentina. The Argentine census of 1914 shows that 43 ) Giuricich, Ruiz Moreno and Ρ i c h o t, EI fenómeno migratorio, 44-50, 73-85, 134-135, 180-184. M )Germani, Política y sociedad, 248, nr. 5, analyzes data between 1869 and 1959. Argentina increased its population tenfold in this period; the United States four times, Brazil six and other American countries less. 30 per cent of the population had been born abroad. One out of every three foreigners was originally from Spain 45 . Known as thrifty and hard-working, the Spaniard was an important figure in the upward mobility of Argentine society which tripled its middle sectors in the eighty years prior to 1950 (Brazil and Mexico only doubled their rates). As urbanités, with a high proportion of single adult immigrants, they also became an important cog in the mechanism of demographic change from high potentiality to low potentiality, the basic step in the transformation from traditional to industrial society 46 . Likewise, they had a large share in the general expansion of the economy: Argentina's foreign trade multiplied 13.78 times from 1869 to 1913 while the national income increased tenfold. In the same period the Argentine railways expanded their network from 10 to 33,478 kilometers, achieving a ratio of 26.18 miles per 10,000 inhabitants (the United States had 27.19 miles per 10,000 inhabitants) 47 . The Third National Census (1914) offers enlightening data on the participation of alien residents in this remarkable economic expansion: 75 per cent of all industry owners and 81 per cent of all business owners were former immigrants 48 . As part of the same economic expansion, Argentina's factories grew from 24,094 (1895) to 48,770 (1914) Not all the immigrants had that fortune which permitted them to join the elite or at least the prosperous middle class. There was a large mass of blue-collar workers who lived in squalid quarters 5°) A. G a 1 a r c e , Bosquejo de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, capital de la Republic», 2 vols., Buenos Aires 1887,1, 525-526;II, 252. s 1 ) Ofelia Pianetto, "Industria y formación de la clase obrera en la ciudad de Cordoba, 1880 -1906 ", in: Homenaje al Doctor Ceferino Garzón Maceda, Cordoba 1973 ) Vázquez Ρ r e s e d o, El caso argentino, 38.
and worked from sunrise to sunset to earn mere subsistence wages. Perhaps they were better off than in Spain, for while lodging and wages were quite the same, food cost four times less 53 . Nevertheless, the dull and back-breaking work in the sweatshops, the lack of hope for a better life and of incentives for improvement drove many to desperation and social activism. Trade-unionism and social activism, as the expression of the pressed working class, had appeared in Spain during the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1865 Giuseppe Fanelli, an Italian and close friend of Bakunin, had been sent to Barcelona and Madrid to organize the first local anarchist groups. The Catalans established the International Association of Workers in 1869 and soon had agents working for them in other industrial and mining centers, spreading the gospel of social reform. In the 1870's the labor movement had branched into three ideologically different groups: Anarchism, strong in Catalonia, Galicia and Andalusia; Marxist Socialism, which became very active in Madrid, Extremadura, Nueva Castilla and later also in Asturias, Vizcaya, Huelva and Alicante; and the Christian Labor Movement, organized in 1864 by Father Antonio Vicent in Manresa, under the denomination of Círculos Católicos de Obreros which soon had 117 agencies all over the Peninsula, being particularly strong in Valencia. insisted that there was an "abundance of Spaniards on the police lists of those arrested for social crimes". After describing a terrorist plot he reiterated that "the number of Spaniards participating in these events is very high" and that many shop-owners were reluctant to hire Spanish workers because they considered them "dangerous". In May of the same year, he sent to Madrid a list of Spanish anarchists from Rosario which was supplied by the local police; strangely, there were only two Catalans (one from Barcelona and one from Lérida) among the twenty-two names. In 1922, in Patagonia, Spanish anarchists were again involved in a libertarian uprising 57 .
Spaniards were not as well represented among the Socialists, with the exception of Bartolomé Victory y Suárez, a printer, journalist and co-founder of the Printers Union in 1878, and Dr. Serafín Alvarez, who, as early as 1873, had published some of the first Socialist propaganda brochures 58 .
To complete this information about Spanish participation in the working class struggles, mention should be made of trade unions and small retail-shop owner's organizations in which Spaniards were strongly represented: mechanical and blacksmith shops, printers, saddlers, taxi drivers, waiters, bar owners, dairymen, male nurses, morgue attendants, retail grocers, plumbers, carpenters, and electricians 59 .
In summary, Spanish labor activists, together with other foreign and Argentine comrades, were responsible for virtually every important reform achieved by the working class during those long years of difficult struggle 60 . Spaniards reached their lowest level of participation in Argentine life in the political sphere. Germani's explanation for the failure of foreigners to fully integrate into Argentine society and therefore, to fully participate in the functional performance of democracy should be re-examined. Although he makes the point that Spaniards and Italians had a more accelerated acculturation, the facts are: a) Spaniards had the least problem of personal adaptation of all foreigners; b) if they participated in voluntary societies it was mainly for the purpose of entertainment or charity (hospitals, orphanages and retirement houses); c) the large majority of resident Spaniards were members of linguistic and ethnic minorities (Galicians, Catalans and Basques), and were the least prone to identification with Spain, unless with the region they had left behind. To a Spanish worker it might be profitable to belong to a trade union but to become an Argentine citizen would only complicate his life. As an alien resident he paid the same taxes, underwent no additional controls or inspections and had the same obligations and rights as the natives but he was free from military service and other unpaid civic duties. Although he could become a citizen, until passage of the Saenz Peña Law in 1913, his participation in political campaigns or as a candidate was practically an impossibility, as politics were a club affair of the upper classes. In the pluralistic society created by mass immigration, little pressure was exerted on the foreigner to become an Argentine. To the Spanish businessmen, as most alien residents, it was much easier to contribute to both contending political parties than to become affiliated with one and loose customers who belonged to the opposition. In general, the political participation of naturalized aliens was very low (2.3 per cent in the Radical Party in the elections of 1916), even among the lower strata of the society. In 1914, out of 917 Socialist voters in the disdtrict of La Boca, in the city of Buenos Aires, only 10 (about 1 per cent) were naturalized citizens of Spanish origin. Citizens of Italian origin represented 7.2 per cent of the electorate with 66 voters in the area which was known as "little Genoa" or the "Republic of the Boca". It would appear that even in a district where Italians were a clear majority of the population» they did not feel inclined to become involved in the political process® 1 .
AMAE, Política
The Impact of Migration on Spanish-Argentine Governmental Relationships
Spanish diplomats seemed to share that spirit of political "non involvement". In 1922-a Spanish lawyer started a public campaign to have President Hipólito Yrigoyen decorated by the Spanish government, but the Spanish Chargé d'affaires Adolfo Danvila thought it was an unseemly gesture promoted "by third rate Spanish elements" and that any demonstration in favour of President Yrigoyen was "a big mistake, because it was the same as making a political profession of faith and affiliating to a political party, something our countrymen should always try to avoid" 62 . In the cultural field, relations between Spain and Argentina were kept at the level of friendly indifference. Although Argentines loved zarzuela (Spanish light opera), Spanish theater and literature, they also had a particular love for the underdog. Argentine newspapers brought daily columns by Emilio Castelar, the famous political writer and Argentines flocked to listen Spaniards of universal prestige such as Marcelina Menéndez y Pelayo, Jacinto Benavente, José María Salaverría, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, José Ortega y Gasset, Eugenio D'Ors, José María Pemán and later, Federico García Lorca. Although this may have been sign of appetite of culture, it was not an expression of cultural dependence as implied in the saying of Adolfo Gonzalez Posada: "There is no ocean between Cádiz and Buenos Aires". Some of these authors wrote magnificent but unrealistic eulogies to Ar- gentina (Blasco Ibáñez, Salaverría); others, in later writings, critized the materialism and lack of real Spanish spirit of the country 63 . In the 1890's the Spaniards residing in Argentina still had a sense of identification with the Peninsula. During the Cuban War of Independence, which created deep feelings of sympathy in Latin America, Spaniards in Buenos Aires organized the "Asociación Patriótica Española" to gather funds for the Peninsula. They succeeded in .collecting enough money to buy a cruiser, the "Rio de la Plata" (1898) which never saw action as it was delivered after the Treaty of Paris.
Relations between Spanish diplomats and the resident community were practically non existent; the upper class envoys considered the emigrants to be "third rank", materialistic Spaniards, and they had nothing but contempt for enrichened indianos who returned home to show off their success 64 . The worst they could do, and did, was try to destroy the regionalist spirit of Spanish residents, to persecute their newspapers and to scorn their language (as was the case in Spain, where efforts were made to combat the Galician, Catalan and Basque in the schools). Hostilities between ethnic minorities and Spanish representatives in Buenos Aires broke out in the 1870's and persisted through later years, but they were never as intense as in the 1920's. Carlists, liberals and republicans could feel nothing but resentment against the haughty representatives of Alfonso XIII and Primo de Rivera. The envoys sent long communiques back to Madrid critizing the lack of emigrant solidarity with Spain. Argentina remained a passive spectator as the diplomats tried to muzzle the anti-Spanish campaign of the Basque newspaper "Irritzy" in Buenos Aires, the sharp commentaries of "Crítica" written by its several Spanish journalists and the articles of Abelardo Fernández Arias in "Vida Nueva", all of which were unfavourable to the King and Primo de Rivera's regime 65 . The duke of Amalfi was the ambassador who created the strongest hatred among the minority residents. He was naturally suspicious of the Galician newspaper "El Correo de Galicia" which represented the largest Spanish group but, like his predecessors, he could not prevent it from being published. He tried unsuccesfully to turn large Buenos Aires newspapers like "La Nación" and "La Prensa" to his side. The envoy also intended to influence the police against the performance of Unamuno 's theater, as the writer's rebellion against Primo de Rivera's regime "inspired strong sympathy among the Argentines", according to his observations. It should be noted that President Marcelo T. de Alvear attended the performance of "Todo un hombre", later filmed in Argentina. The structure of the work developed around poverty in Spain and the return of a rich indiano.
With an accusation of illegal gambling, the duke of Amalfi pressured the police into breaking into the Casa de Galicia and the Club Español, both of which were important Spanish social institutions. He also induced the police to forbid a conference of the Galician Rodrigo Soriano and to disallow the. singing of the Basque national anthem, Guernikako Arbola, by the choir of the Basque club Laurak Bat, at a commemoration of the founding of Buenos Aires in 1580 by Juan de Garay (a Basque).
In addition to these measures of supposed protection of the Spanish community, the duke of Amalfi gave an imprudent public lecture against the literary work of Benito Pérez Galdós. To sum up, he persecuted, insulted and despised every man, institution or club which was not openly proclaiming its love for Spain and Primo de Rivera. To Amalfi, all newspapers were constantly involved in "slander compaigns" and all journalists were "insolent". Unamuno was the "petulant ex-president of the University of Salamanca"; the Laurak Bat an "impudently Basque association"; the Canary Islands Center (Centro Canario) an "assem- blage of republican and masonic rogues supporting the 'Diario Español"', and he regarded most of the leaders of the Spanish community in Buenos Aires as men belonging "to the enemy gangs in the best and largest institutions". Such actions were follish and condemned as such by Primo de Rivera. The Spanish dictator was correct in believing that the policy of his ambassador in Buenos Aires could easily be used as "a pretext for new anti-Spanish campaigns by separatists" (particularly Basques and Catalans), "anarchists and other similar elements, so abundant in our Spanish communities in America" 66 . The awkward behavior of the duke of Amalfi derived, finally, in his remotion from the position he held in Buenos Aires.
For their thinking on Spain, Argentines had no better teachers than the local Spanish residents. If the lectures of Ortega y Gasset or Garcia Lorca became smashing successes, the fact that the speakers were liberals and "anti-government" was not lost on the Argentines. With the help of Spaniards, Buenos Aires became not only the largest Spanish or Spanish-speaking city in the world but also the largest "Galician" city. All Spaniards, in a friendly or derisive way, were called gallegos and even though they were sometimes ridiculed in the theater or in soap-operas over the radio, they quickly became integrated into the folklore of the city and the country which put them closer to the Argentine heart than other gringos (foreigners).
To retrieve from the diplomatic tension created by the duke of Amalfi, Primo de Rivera appointed Ramiro de Maeztu as ambassador in Argentina in early 1928. The decision was well based on Maeztu's intellectual prestige, the familiarity of his name to many Argentines who read his articles publsihed by "La Nación" over a period of twenty years, and the creation and launching of the last Primo de Rivera's cultural enterprise, the Cultural Relations Foundation (1927) . In spite of the initial effort, the newly created institution had little impact on the Spanish-Argentine community. This was due to the prevailing feelings against Primo de Rivera, his open manipulation of power and his international policies.
Although Ramiro de Maeztu's respected but controversial personality and works do not fall within the scope of this study, it should be noted that it was in Buenos Aires where he forged his concept of Hispanismo, later discussed in his "Defensa de la Hispanidad" (Madrid, 1934). Maeztu lived in Great Britain and lectured in the United States in 1925 but had not previous exposure to the Spanish American various cultures. It is known that Maeztu admired very much the creativeness and organization of the North American people but also, that in their materialism can be found the roots of the "spiritual Hispanistic universe", the idealist but debatable concept Maeztu forged in the largest South American racial melting pot.
The new gospel of Hispanismo was doomed to failure in Argentina. It implied paternalistic attitudes of cultural colonialism that did not excite popular adhesion. Only a few Hispanophiles, members of the intellectual group of the newspaper "La Nueva República" (Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta, Ernesto Palacio, Cesar E. Pico, and Tomás E. Casares among others) encouraged and supported their close friend Maeztu's concept. In contrast, most intellectuals remained insensitive or became critic to Maeztu, no matter their political affiliations. Perhaps Leopoldo Lugones best expressed the feelings of men like himself, Ricardo Rojas or Alfredo Palacios, when faced with this new hispanistic policy retorted: "Spaniards do not and cannot know us; they should not concern themselves with us". There was no need for an implicitly assumed leadership of Spain in Argentina. Perhaps Argentines and Spaniards living in Argentina felt they had a long way to go toward solving all national problems but they had decided to make their own way, without the help of cultural crutches and without a motherhood complex 67 . This may be one of the greatest contributions made by Spanish residents in molding the Argentine social structure of today.
Politica, Argentina, legajo 2317. The ambassador's reports to Primo de Rivera attached long letters written to the former by several Spanish groups, all residing in Buenos Aires. Although the content of that correspondence differs, a crude and insulting language characterizes it. This was even more evident in the letters sent to the duke of Amalfi. Macztu's official correspondence enclosed many newspapers clippings which clearly show his attachment to the group of "La Nueva República". In contrast, Julio Irazusta's "Memorias" briefly mention Maeztu. See Julio Irazusta, Memories {Historia de un historiador a la fuerza), Buenos Aires 1975, 216, 
